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I was sitting, ruefully contemplating the dilemmas of being a com-
mentator, wondering whether I had the effrontery to rise and offer a
dreadful confession: the first time I encountered the counter-
majoritarian difficulty, I didn't bite. I didn't say, "Wow, that's a giant
problem." I didn't immediately start casting about for ingenious ways
to solve or dissolve it. I just shrugged. Now I don't think that's because
my commitments to either democracy or constitutionalism are somehow
faulty or suspect. Nor do I think it's that they obviously cohere. It's
rather that the framing, "look, these nine unelected characters can strike
down a statute passed in procedurally valid ways by a democratically
elected legislature," struck me as unhelpful.
As I say, I was wondering whether I had the effrontery to rise with
this dreadful confession. I decided that I didn't. I'm just a commentator,
after all, and I'm not allowed to suggest that we change the subject. Be-
sides, to be more serious, I admire Professor Michelman for having the
courage of his convictions. He is relentless in pursuing the implications
of his starting premises. So 4I want to suggest several ways in which his
problem is both more and less complicated than he believes. Identifying
the political and conceptual price we pay for framing matters this way,
seeing to just what extremes we are driven, might help persuade us to
step back and try to frame things differently.
Recall Frank's distinction between liberal and populist theories of
self-government. The liberal holds that each and every individual must
be self-governing; the populist holds that it's enough if we are members
of a community that is self-governing.' I want to underline a point that
Frank concedes: what he styles the liberal view is impossible. That has
nothing to do with judicial review. It has only to do with minorities.
Every time the state acts against my will-indeed every time the state
acts in ways I haven't commissioned-I am not self-governing. Not, at
least, on a captious account of self-government. If I may tease Frank just
a bit on the strange ideological company he's keeping here, 'this is just
the view that drove Lysander Spooner, nineteenth-century lawyer and
Copyright 0 1998 California Law Review, Inc.
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1. See Frank I. Michelman, Brennan and Democracy, 86 CALIF. L. REv. 399,402-03 (1998).
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hero of today's libertarians, to the eccentric views that ballots are mor-
ally indistinguishable from bullets and that the Constitution wasn't in-
tended to establish a government.2
Nor do I see any reason to take Frank's liberal-I'd rather say
"liberal"-account as an ideal, worth striving for even if we can't ever
attain it, for the only strategies I can imagine for pursuing it are vi-
ciously anti-liberal: we could stifle dissent, brainwash people, and so on.
How else could we eliminate minorities? The populist account, seeing us
as members of a community that taken collectively governs itself, is the
only viable account on offer. (Thus my title: the "individualism" to be
jettisoned is a methodological position, not any first-order moral or po-
litical view. I am as devoted to autonomy, to the right of the gutsy or
downright deviant to do their thing-provided of course they don't
harm others etc. etc. ad nauseam-as anyone I know. But that kind of
individualism is a political view, to be exhibited and defended in richly
sociological terms.' The suspect form of individualism dictates that we
must always reduce talk of such social collectives as communities and
institutions to talk of individuals.)
But does the populist account settle for something crummy? Does it
fail to redeem what's intuitively attractive in the promise of democratic
self-government? (A historical point to ponder: Self-government has
had two antonyms, being ruled by foreign armies and subjects being
ruled by aristocrats and kings. The populist account surely is the oppo-
site, or an opposite, of those two distinguished traditions.) Frank com-
plains that seeing us as identifying with a community that collectively
makes these decisions turns democratic self-government into feeling,
not action; identity, not agency. I think not; at any rate I think he's
moving too quickly. Consider:
* The sports fan jumps up from his couch at the buzzer, turns off
the TV, and screams, "We won!" This seems to me feeling, not
action; identity, not agency. (But what if he jumps up in the
stands after cheering himself hoarse, thinking about the home-
team advantage and his instrumental role in helping the team
keep an emotional edge?)
" You are an American citizen, with no dual nationality. But you
happen to be obsessed with Irish politics. You huddle over your
short-wave radio listening to the news; you rejoice at the intro-
duction of divorce; you curse Ian Paisley; you wonder about the
precise nature of your affection for Mary Robinson. Now you're
like the sports fan, passively watching a game in which you have
no role.
2. See LYSANDER SPOONER, No TREASON (1867).
3. That's one way of putting the central aspiration of DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES (1989).
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" The democratic citizen works hard on a measure: she argues
with her friends and coworkers, stuffs envelopes, attends meet-
ings, and donates unseemly scads of money to an unseemly
PAC. The measure prevails. "We won!" she says. Here there is
action, for sure, but the we refers to the prevailing majority. What
about the minority? Are they victims, succumbing to hetero-
nomy, not enjoying self-government?
" A limousine liberal, fine representative of an endangered species,
notices to his chagrin that the federal government is aggressively
promoting the marketing of US cigarettes in foreign countries.
He thinks this a decidedly bad thing, but hasn't done anything at
all about it. Sadly, he murmurs, "We're killing foreign teenagers
to make money." Here the we refers to all of us Americans, re-
gardless of our views on the issue, regardless of whether we even
are aware of it, regardless of what we might have done: state ac-
tion implicates all of us. This case is tricky. Is the we the same as
that invoked by the sports fan on the couch? I'm inclined to say
no, because the sports fan can't get in the game but the citizen
can. Remember that we routinely extend agency to hold people
accountable for things they haven't done but could and should
have done.
" Because of her staunch Christian commitments, a citizen believes
that abortion is the murder of innocent human life. She pours
her heart into campaigning for a constitutional amendment ban-
ning abortion. She fails. Need she identify willy-nilly with the
prevailing legal view? Couldn't-wouldn't-she urge that she is
heteronomous, forced to submit to a will very much not her
own? Maybe so: I don't think there's some brute fact of the
matter about these things. It depends in part on how she con-
ceives of herself, how she draws the boundaries of her own iden-
tity, or, if you like, the nature of her allegiances. It would be
reasonable for her to feel implicated by the current view: and I
wouldn't want feel here to summon up the sort of thing Frank
characterizes-or lampoons-as a mere mood or emotional
fancy.4 (Contrast how she might respond to learning that Sweden
permits abortion.) It would be reasonable for her not to feel im-
plicated. Arguably-but it's an argument that would take too
long here-people lead richer lives when they refuse to secure
their autonomy by shrinking the scope of their commitments to
others: Grettir shouldn't be the ideal of individual autonomy.'
I mean these crude vignettes to suggest that genuinely collective
action isn't the least bit mysterious. Otherwise subtle legal theorists
4. See Michelman, supra note 1, at 418.
5. I'm thinking of the medieval Icelandic saga, whose strength hero isn't just outlawed but
shuns all social contact as a threat to his independence. For a translation, see GRmI'I'S SAGA
(Denton Fox & Hermann Palsson trans., 1974).
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routinely lapse into crass skepticism here, summoning up scarecrow im-
ages of group consciousness, organicism, and the like. One doesn't have
to believe in Casper the Social Ghost to think that groups can act.6 In
fact, I find it impossible to lend any clear sense to the thought that indi-
viduals are finally prior to institutions. Methodological individualists in
the social sciences proclaim that there's no such thing as Congress, no
possibility of Congress, without 535 individual Congresspersons. Sure,
but there's no possibility of being a Congressperson without the institu-
tion of Congress. Or again, if 100 Senators and the Vice President find
themselves at a Georgetown cocktail party, they simply cannot pass leg-
islation or censure a colleague or even, strictly speaking, debate a bill on
the merits. They cannot do these things even if each and every one of
them sincerely believes that is what they are doing, not even if each and
every one of them knows that all the others share the belief. Instead, a
series of conventions, including calling the group to order in the cham-
ber, are required to mark off the possibility of their acting as a group.
So their mental states aren't decisive, aren't even particularly relevant.
Notice that they can also be acting as Senators-say, placing remarks
formally on the Congressional Record-without knowing or believing
that is what they are doing, say while they think they are just clowning
around. Yet again, think of the everyday social practice of introducing
yourself, offering a quick sketch of your personal identity. What you
do, in fact, is rattle off a series of social roles you occupy: you're a
professor, a husband, and so on. But roles are just defined by their
places in institutions.
So too, groups can have a genuinely common good that isn't the
sum of their individual members' goods: contrast how easily Frank
falls into the summation of people's expressed preference vectors.7 In-
deed, groups can have a common good that isn't good for any individ-
ual. Suppose that not a single member of your law school faculty finds
it worthwhile, all things considered, to pitch in and do a conscientious
job helping govern the school, since serving on committees or showing
up at job talks and faculty meetings is too cumbersome. Still the school
will be better off if its members are reasonably conscientious; it will run
better. A law school is in fact the sort of thing that can flourish. Some-
times its members will flourish as it does: their careers will go swim-
mingly, they will relish teaching newly improved students, and so on.
But its flourishing doesn't consist in the members' flourishing. And
again, sometimes its members will not flourish as it does: sometimes the
6. For a useful corrective to the usual skepticism, see MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS
(1989); GILBERT, LIVING TOGETHER (1996).
7. See Michelman, supra note 1, at 404.
[Vol. 86:459
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school's flourishing will be purchased at the price of the members'
doing badly.
I think, then, that we should abandon Frank's stringently individu-
alistic reading of self-government and that we shouldn't be the least bit
forlorn about doing so. But I'm jumping a bit ahead of myself; I want
to pay more sustained attention to Frank's discussion. So let's
ask: What's so special about judicial review? Other institutional ar-
rangements of the modem state raise very much the same problem that
tantalizes those riveted on individual autonomy. In this sense, the prob-
lem is worse than Frank suspects.
Consider the administrative state. Decades ago, the political scientist
Ted Lowi urged that the rule of law was dead, destroyed by bureauc-
racy.'Legislatures, he railed, didn't pass real laws any more. They threw
up their hands and delegated authority to unaccountable bureau-
crats: "Whereas," he imagined modem laws saying, "this is a huge
problem, and whereas we haven't got the time or information to figure
out what the hell to do about it, we hereby broadly empower some new
agency to take the invidiously abstract and flaccid language we will now
write and turn it into real rules." There is something grand, to be sure,
in the spectacle of the Supreme Court wrestling with abortion or hate
speech. (But they wrestle too with the interstate commerce clause and the
tax code.) Still, bureaucrats are out there drafting rules on zillions of
subjects, rules that will have the force of law-rules that, in the post-
Chadha9 world, our elected legislatures can't even overrule, and that, in
the post-Chevron ° world, officially require extraordinary deference
from courts. Notice that the situation Lowi describes might be taken si-
multaneously as a challenge to the rule of law and a challenge to demo-
cratic self-government.
Or consider the Federal Reserve Board. The Board has a remark-
able level of autonomy in its decision making, and what Congressional
oversight is imposed in committee hearings and the like tends to be re-
markably deferential. (Recall Supreme Court confirmations in the good
old days.) The stuff that Alan Greenspan has to worry about daily-
here's a confession I will publicly make-turns my eyelids into a lead
alloy at a moment's notice. But it is politically crucial. And I can't do a
thing about it. Notice too that economists might not give a damn about
topics that happen to engage me, like contempt for pariah groups and
the conservative assault on democratic debate, but be passionately inter-
ested in the prime interest rate.
8. See THEODORE LOwi, THE END oF LIBERALISM (1969).
9. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
10. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
1998]
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Now one could say about both the bureaucrats and the Fed that
they are enabling conditions of democratic self-government. Forcing
Congress to draft administrative rules themselves wouldn't be a triumph
of democratic self-government. It would instead grind the legislature to
a halt. (This is just an application of a point about power: Aggregating
all power to yourself makes you less powerful, not more. To be power-
ful, a principal requires powerful agents. So too with the peo-
ple: imagine the so-called direct democrat who thinks it would enhance
our autonomy if we could draft-or had to draft-bureaucratic regula-
tions in mass popular conventions.) In a roughly similar way, one might
argue that taking the decisions of the Fed out of the hands of the legis-
lature is of course a constraint, but it's a constraint that opens up possi-
bilities that would otherwise be unavailable. Whatever one is inclined to
argue, those with Frank's individualistic concern for self-government
have no reason to restrict their attention to judicial review.
I want to turn finally to Frank's concluding comments on epis-
temic interaction, the it-ain't-everything-but-it's-better-than-nothing
solution that he thinks comports in the main with Brennan's jurispru-
dence. 1 I want to link these comments to a contrast Frank invokes in
passing. I'm not sure how deliberate his invocation is-the contrast in
question is many centuries old now and it springs to tongue or pen or
computer rather more easily than it actually springs to mind-but it's
his contrast nonetheless: I have parol evidence. Frank tends to gloss
constitutionalism and the rule of law in terms of reason, self-government
and politics in terms of preference or desire. I'm inclined to doubt the
contrast, so put. Not, I should emphasize, for the reason we associate
with the crass side of legal realism, with Jerome Frank (and not, alas,
Holmes or Cohen or Llewellyn)-that judicial interpretation might be
unmasked as the imposition of the judge's preferences. 2 That line of
argument is unutterably crude; on these matters, Professor Dworkin's
views are infinitely better. 3 Instead, I doubt the contrast because demo-
cratic politics is ordinarily chock full of reason-giving, argument, and
deliberation. (So Frank himself noticed some years ago, though he then
thought of this in terms of republicanism. 4) But maybe, then, the
counter-majoritarian difficulty is a real difficulty for people who believe
democracy is fundamentally a matter of preference aggregation. Maybe
those of us inclined to think of democracy as government by discussion
shouldn't take the bait.
Anyway, the Supreme Court, Frank suggests, might be taken as
duly considering the reasons offered by far-flung and diverse social
11. See Michelman, supra note 1, at 420-27.
12. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
13. I prefer the statement in RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
14. See Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
[Vol. 86:459
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actors. So they might. But reasoning, I want to suggest, must already be
deeply political, in ways further radicalizing the 'implications of Frank's
starting premises. Here's why.
Classical empiricists of the Enlightenment were fond of urging
people to think for themselves. Don't defer to others, they insisted;
don't take things on faith; be skeptical, be critical, think things through
for yourself; make sure you justify your beliefs, because only justified
beliefs qualify as knowledge. This is invigorating advice. It is epistemic
self-government. But-if we construe it on the model of Frank's
"liberal" reading of self-government-it's impossible.
As a matter of brute fact, we are hugely and irrevocably dependent
on others for what we know. I believe the Soviet Union fell in 1989 be-
cause I read about it in the newspapers: that is, because other people
told me. "But you saw a bit of it, with your own eyes, on TV!" That is, I
saw scenes that other people told me were the fall of the Soviet Union.
"You could fly there yourself!" That is, I could get on a plane and fly
to a place that others would tell me is Russia and the people there would
tell me about what happened in 1989. And I would believe them. I be-
lieve that this is Frank Michelman and that this is Ronald Dworkin and
that this is the inaugural lecture of the Brennan Institute at NYU, all be-
cause people have told me so. I have no reason to doubt them, of course,
but that doesn't mean I somehow made up my mind for myself. I also
believe that 2x2=4, but only because it was drummed into my head
when I was a kid. I happen to know enough philosophy of mathematics
to know that I can't myself justify the belief.
Now suppose that we construe politics as the realm of controversy
over legitimate authority. Notice that we have controversies about epis-
temic authority: about who to believe, in what ways, on what subjects,
and so on. Are moral philosophers' views on abortion more credible
than those of the Roman Catholic Church? than those of the fabled man
on the street? than those of doctors who administer abortions? or those
of women who have had them? Whose views on political economy
should we adopt, those of the Economist or those of the Nation? And so
on. We have a division of epistemic labor. Some of it seems relatively
uncontroversial. It is better to believe what Frank tells you about public
law on welfare entitlements than it is to believe me. But some of it is bit-
terly controversial, and rightly so.
What you believe depends on who you believe. (But there's no
strict priority relationship: who you believe depends on what you be-
lieve, too.) Worse, what you know depends on who you know. (And
again, who you know depends on what you know.) Now we can see a
new threat to individual autonomy (on Frank's Spooneresque reading
of it): Every day, you accept beliefs from others who don't share your
1998]
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preferred account of epistemic authority. Worse, you live under the
reign of social institutions with their own official accounts. Epistemic
authority, too, isn't a natural fact; it is, in Frank's fine phrase, politically
decideable.
Frank imagined the Supreme Court as the tribunal of reason,
democratic in being epistemically responsive to a wide range of views.
Here, alas, I have to dissent not just from Frank but apparently also from
Brennan. The Court manifestly isn't and shouldn't be a freewheeling
arena of political agitation. If it were, Frankfurter's old worries about
super-legislatures would apply in force. 5 (I say this ruefully. It is not
easy to make me sympathize with Frankfurter or disagree with
Brennan.) Existing law constrains who can come to the Court and what
they can talk about. Think of rules of standing, the law of evidence, the
treatment of amici briefs, as the law's internal account of epistemic
authority.
Is there a democratic account of epistemic authority? Sure: it re-
quires sneering at self-appointed poohbahs and pompous asses, being
skeptical of the self-interested claims of the wealthy and powerful, and
so on. And there is a tempting first pass at a more inclusive norm: Pay
attention to the merits of the argument, not the status of the speaker. But
that one looks perilously like returning us to the paralysis of the indi-
vidualistic reading of classical empiricism, making up one's own mind
on everything for oneself. Here I will shamelessly ask for your own
epistemic deference-trust me, I've thought a lot about this: our con-
troversies about epistemic authority are remarkably detailed and com-
plicated.
Could we resolve them democratically? Well, we can and do discuss
them in public. At any moment in the discussion, each of us is implicitly
relying on a set of background beliefs about epistemic authority: we
eagerly attend to some speakers, yawn at others. We can and do revise
those beliefs over time. They are provisionally fixed; some are more
entrenched than others (recall Quine'6); but they can always be criticized
and revised. We just can't revise them all at once, for then we would
have nowhere to stand, no other beliefs to rely on in evaluating the ones
we're doubting. 7 We can change them if we want to. This, I suggest, is
15. See Frankfurter's dissent in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 648
(1943). The original reference to "super-legislature" seems to be Brandeis's dissent in Jay Bums
Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 524 n.36 (1924). Some such distinction between courts and
legislatures is essential, though of course its content must remain controversial; thus the point has been
routinely invoked by those otherwise sharply at odds with Frankfurter. See for instance Black's
dissent in Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 788 (1945), and Douglas's
opinion in Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421,422 (1952).
16. For a useful introduction, W. V. QunN, THE WEB OF BELIEF (1970).
17. The crucial text remains LuDWIG WITTGENsTEIN, ON CERTAINTY (1969) (exploring limits
of Cartesian skepticism and failures of some rejoinders to it).
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what properly bears the weight of popular autonomy. Not just for epis-
temic authority, but for social and political practices more generally.
That old pragmatist or antifoundationalist sentiment brings me
back full circle to the problem that so worries Frank, that of reconciling
constitutionalism and democracy. Both constitutionalism and democ-
racy are arenas of argument and arenas of action. In both we've
adopted all kinds of division of labor: we have tort lawyers and people
doing jurisprudence, subcommittees hearing expert testimony, and so
on. In both we can and do revise what we're up to as we go. We can
change our minds, change the ways we make up our minds, change our
practices, you name it. At a particular moment, a particular citizen might
be appalled at a decision of the Supreme Court, true. And she might be
appalled at the considerations that Supreme Court justices find disposi-
tive or whose views they find authoritative. But so too she might be ap-
palled at a decision of Congress or the Federal Reserve Board or a
bureaucrat drafting rules for OSHA. So too she might suspect that the
consensus among evolutionary biologists on male aggression is infected
with misogynist politics and misogynist epistemic norms. Provided all
these views and practices are reasonably open to public scrutiny and
revision, I claim, they meet the test of democratic self-government. And
the Supreme Court-showered with news coverage, popular and schol-
arly commentary, amici briefs, you name it-is anything but the most
intransigently antidemocratic institution around. In this way, Frank's
radicalization of the counter-majoritarian dilemma is singling out an
inappropriate target.
Like Quinean beliefs, many practices are pretty deeply entrenched.
It would be very hard-politically hard and legally hard alike-to get
rid of the Federal Reserve Board. But we could, eventually, if we decided
it made sense. There is then nothing special here about judicial review,
no special reason to be anxious about the so-called counter-majoritarian
difficulty. What's the worry?
1998]
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